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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _____________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 The defendant, Benton Harbor Engineering ("Benton 
Harbor"), appeals from an order of the district court denying its 
motion for a new trial, and also from a judgment against it on a 
contribution claim brought by Asplundh Tree Expert Co. 
("Asplundh") and by National Union Fire Insurance Company of 
Pittsburgh ("National Union"), Asplundh's liability insurance 
carrier.  Asplundh and National Union sought to recover some or 
all of their costs in settling a wrongful death suit brought 
against Asplundh by the estate of Jeffrey Sackerson, who was 
killed when an Asplundh aerial lift in which he was working 
fractured (Benton Harbor having manufactured the component part 
of the aerial lift which allegedly failed).  Benton Harbor's 
principal argument on appeal is that the district court erred in 
  
permitting Asplundh to adduce lay opinion testimony pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 regarding what appear to be complex 
technical issues concerning the cause of the metal failure.   
 Rule 701, which contemplates admission of lay opinions 
rationally based on personal knowledge so as to be helpful to the 
trier of fact, was primarily designed to allow lay individuals to 
express opinions that are in reality only a shorthand statement 
of fact.  However, this court, like other courts, has commonly 
interpreted the rule to permit individuals not qualified as 
experts, but possessing experience or specialized knowledge about 
particular things, to testify about technical matters that might 
have been thought to lie within the exclusive province of 
experts.  This flexible, arguably expansive, interpretation of 
Rule 701 appears to be consistent with its text.  Where, however, 
a party proffers a witness expressing an opinion on matters such 
as the design of hydraulic cylinders or the cause of metal 
failure, the trial court must be rigorous in assuring that the 
lay witness satisfies the strictures of Rule 701.  In particular, 
the proponent of technical lay opinion testimony must show that 
the testimony is based on sufficient experience or specialized 
knowledge and also show a sufficient connection between such 
knowledge or experience and the lay opinion such that it may be 
fairly considered to be "rationally based on the perception of 
the witness" and truly "helpful" to the jury. 
 Given the standard we articulate today for the 
admission of lay opinion evidence of a technical nature, we 
conclude that the district court’s ruling was based on an 
  
impermissible interpretation of Rule 701; that is, because the 
court failed to examine with sufficient rigor whether the 
testimony in question was informed by sufficient experience or 
specialized knowledge.  More particularly, in order to satisfy 
the rationally derived and helpfulness standards of Rule 701, 
Asplundh needed to demonstrate that the witness possessed 
sufficient experience or specialized knowledge which qualified 
him to offer a technical opinion regarding the cause of metal 
failure and the design of hydraulic cylinders.  While a lay 
witness could acquire this additional insight either by formal 
education or practical experience, it appears the witness at 
issue simply possessed neither.  Because the admission of the 
testimony was not harmless, we will reverse the judgment of the 
district court and remand for further proceedings. 
 Although Asplundh and National Union cross appeal, 
arguing that the district court erred in failing to award 
prejudgment interest, we do not, in view of our result, reach 
this question.   
 
 I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 Jeffrey Sackerson was killed while operating an aerial 
lift, manufactured by Asplundh, which was mounted onto a truck 
chassis and used in tree trimming operations.  At the time, 
Sackerson was employed by the city of Portland, Oregon, which 
owned, operated and maintained the aerial lift.  When Sackerson's 
estate filed a wrongful death suit against Asplundh, Asplundh and 
its insurer, National Union, brought a third-party action seeking 
  
contribution and indemnity from Benton Harbor, the manufacturer 
of the lower boom cylinder containing the piston rod which 
allegedly fractured and caused the accident.  The jury returned a 
verdict for Asplundh and National Union, finding Asplundh eighty 
percent responsible and Benton Harbor twenty percent responsible.  
The district court entered judgment for Asplundh and National 
Union in the amount of $185,881.60, twenty percent of the 
Sackerson settlement.  Post-trial motions were filed by both 
parties.  Asplundh and National Union sought prejudgment 
interest, and Benton Harbor sought a new trial based on alleged 
error in admitting the lay opinion testimony of Michael Jones.  
Both motions were denied by the district court.  These appeals 
followed. 
 Jones, the witness whose testimony is at issue, had 
been fleet maintenance supervisor for the City of Portland for 
more than ten years at the time of the accident.  Jones's 
responsibilities covered all city equipment, including the 
Asplundh aerial lift.  He supervised between sixty and one 
hundred employees, six or seven city repair shops, and the 
maintenance of 1385 pieces of equipment. 
 After the accident, Jones and his employees took apart 
and inspected the aerial lift's boom assembly in the City of 
Portland's shop.  During this inspection, Jones observed the rod 
from a distance of about fifteen inches.  In his deposition, 
Jones stated his opinion that a component of the lower boom 
assembly --  the rod end -- had fractured.  The rod end was a 
threaded metal rod that was screwed into a threaded metal casing 
  
called the rod cylinder.  A hole was drilled through both the 
casing and the rod end, and a metal pin was inserted through the 
hole.  See App. at 315.   
  Jones expressed the opinion that the fracture was 
caused by metal fatigue and was attributable to the design of the 
rod end.  Id. at 161, 167.  Specifically, he stated that there 
was a "problem" because Benton Harbor's design called for a hole 
to be drilled through the rod end at a point where it was 
threaded.  Id.  Moreover, Jones noted that the cylinder rod had 
oxidized around a portion of the break which was a different, 
duller color than the rod's fresh break.  From this, Jones 
concluded that the break occurred in stages.  Jones also related 
that the break was in a threaded area where a hole had been 
drilled through the rod.  Jones concluded that the rod fatigued 
inside the rod eye, causing the accident, stating that the stop 
block on the lower boom cylinder rods did not contribute to the 
accident.1   
 In particular, Jones attributed the accident "to the 
way the rod was drilled through, and the fact that the rod eye 
                     
1
.  Jones stated: 
 
 Well, it seems like -- seemed to me that all 
the bulletins that came out after the fact, 
after Sackerson’s death, were dealing with 
the stop blocks as if the stop blocks somehow 
would have saved his life.  And there’s no 
way I happen to believe that.  Stop blocks 
didn’t have a damn thing in the world to do 
with Sackerson’s death.       
 
App. at 166.   
  
was screwed on on a threaded -- two threaded surfaces."  App. at 
167; App. at 160-61 ("The reasons [for the accident] are two: 
one, the hole through the pin caused . . . the rod to be weakened 
and, two, the threads . . . on the rod itself caused the breaking 
point.  They were sharp, and it broke right at the point where 
all of those things intersected.  That was the problem.  There’s 
no doubt in my mind about it. . . .").  He questioned the 
appropriateness of this rod end design, stating that before his 
examination he "had no idea that this thing was threaded on and 
then drilled and pinned, up to that point," since he "had never 
seen a cylinder that size configured that way."  Id.  Jones 
reiterated that he "never saw other cylinders configured that 
way," and that he "kn[e]w how other cylinders were configured 
differently," since he was a production control manager for a 
company that produced hydraulic cylinders.  Id.  Moreover, Jones 
asserted expertise in this area, declaring, "I think I know how 
to make hydraulic cylinders."  Id. 
 Key portions of Jones's deposition were read to the 
jury over Benton Harbor's objection.  The district court 
overruled the objections to the reading of the deposition 
testimony, allowing Jones to testify as a lay witness expressing 
an opinion under Rule 701.  FED. R. EVID. 701.  Benton Harbor 
argues that Jones's technical deposition testimony is not the 
type of lay opinion evidence properly admissible under Rule 701.  
 Our review is plenary, since the district court’s 
ruling turns on an interpretation of Rule 701, which would permit 
the admission of technical lay opinion evidence in this case.  A 
  
determination regarding the scope of evidence properly admitted 
under a Federal Rule of Evidence is a question of law subject to 
plenary review.  See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm. 911 F.2d 941, 
945 (3d Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 
1989) ("To the extent that the district court’s admission of 
[evidence] was based on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, we exercise plenary review.").   
 
 II.  The Rule 701 Jurisprudence 
 A. 
 In determining whether Jones's opinion testimony was 
properly admitted by the district court, we must determine the 
scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which provides:  
 If the witness is not testifying as an 
expert, the witness' testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the 
witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or 
the determination of a fact in issue. 
 
FED. R. EVID. 701.   
 Rule 701 represents a movement away from the courts' 
historically skeptical view of lay opinion evidence.  At common 
law, witnesses not qualifying as experts were not permitted to 
draw conclusions which could be characterized as opinion 
testimony, but rather were required to limit their testimony to 
facts, those things "they had seen, heard, felt, smelled, tasted, 
or done."  Hon. Charles R. Richey, Proposals To Eliminate the 
Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word "Expert" Under the 
  
Federal Rules [of] Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 
154 F.R.D. 537, 542 (1994) ("Mere opinions were considered 
unreliable bases for testimony.").   
 This rigid distinction between fact and opinion led to 
numerous appeals and pervasive criticism by commentators.  See 
generally 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ¶ 
701[01] (1994).  Wigmore declared, in the first edition of his 
treatise, that this distinction "has done more than any one rule 
of procedure to reduce our litigation towards a sense of 
legalized gambling."  3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1929 at 2563 (1st 
ed. 1904); see also WILLARD L. KING & DOUGLAS PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENCE 
IN ILLINOIS 8 (1942) ("The American courts have had a great 
struggle with a rule which appeared to require them to admit 
statements of fact and exclude all inferences of the witness.  
Such a rule is quite impossible of application: all statements 
contain inferences."); JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON 
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 524 (1898) ("In a sense all testimony to 
matter of fact is opinion evidence, i.e. it is a conclusion 
formed from phenomena and mental impressions."). 
 Characteristically, however, the most eloquent 
criticism of this common-law restriction on lay testimony was 
made by Judge Learned Hand: 
 Every judge of experience in the trial of 
causes has again and again seen the whole 
story garbled, because of insistence upon a 
form with which the witness cannot comply, 
since, like most men, he is unaware of the 
extent to which inference enters into his 
perceptions.  He is telling the "facts" in 
the only way that he knows how, and the 
result of nagging and checking him is often 
  
to choke him altogether, which is, indeed, 
usually its purpose. 
Central R.R. Co. v. Monahan, 11 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1926).  
Judge Hand also stated: 
 The truth is, as Mr. Wigmore has observed at 
length that the exclusion of opinion evidence 
has been carried beyond reason in this 
country, and that it would be a large advance 
if courts were to admit it with freedom.  The 
line between opinion and fact is at best only 
one of degree, and ought to depend solely 
upon practical considerations, as, for 
example, the saving of time and the mentality 
of the witness.   
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
  These concerns about the restrictions on lay 
opinion testimony, combined with a more general liberalization in 
those rules of evidence that operated to deprive the fact-finder 
of relevant evidence,2 led to the adoption of Rule 701.  The 
Advisory Committee Note to the rule reflects the fact that Rule 
701's liberalization of the admissibility of opinion evidence is 
rooted in the modern trend away from fine distinctions between 
fact and opinion and toward greater admissibility, tempered with 
an understanding that the adversary process, and more 
specifically, cross-examination will correct any problems: 
                     
2
.  The admissibility of expert opinion testimony was also more 
limited at common law and liberalized under the Federal Rules.  
Among other requirements, expert testimony was limited to those 
areas that were "not within the common knowledge of the average 
layman."  Bridger v. Union Railway Co., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th 
Cir. 1966).  With the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
the common law restrictions on expert testimony have been 
liberalized and the permissible content has been broadened. 
  
 The rule retains the traditional objective of 
putting the trier of fact in possession of an 
accurate reproduction of the event. 
 
 Limitation (a) is the familiar requirement of 
first-hand knowledge or observation. 
 
 Limitation (b) is phrased in terms of 
requiring testimony to be helpful in 
resolving issues.  Witnesses often find 
difficulty in expressing themselves in 
language which is not that of an opinion or 
conclusion.  While the courts have made 
concessions in certain recurring situations, 
necessity as a standard for permitting 
opinions and conclusions has proved too 
elusive and too unadaptable to particular 
situations for purposes of satisfactory 
judicial administration.  Moreover, the 
practical impossibility of determining by 
rule what is a "fact," demonstrated by a 
century of litigation of the question of what 
is a fact for purposes of pleading under the 
Field Code, extends into evidence also.  The 
rule assumes that the natural characteristics 
of the adversary system will generally lead 
to an acceptable result, since the detailed 
account carries more conviction that the 
broad assertion, and a lawyer can be expected 
to display his witness to the best advantage.  
If he fails to do so, cross-examination and 
argument will point up the weakness.  If, 
despite these considerations, attempts are 
made to introduce meaningless assertions 
which amount to little more than choosing up 
sides, exclusion for lack of helpfulness is 
called for by the rule. 
 
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note (citations omitted). 
 
 The prototypical example of the type of evidence 
contemplated by the adoption of Rule 701 relates to the 
appearance of persons or things, identity, the manner of conduct, 
competency of a person, degrees of light or darkness, sound, 
size, weight, distance and an endless number of items that cannot 
  
be described factually in words apart from inferences.  See Mason 
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 417 (1952).  The more 
liberal approach to lay opinion testimony of this type gained 
acceptance as a rule of "convenience," which allowed for 
"`shorthand renditions' of a total situation, or [for] statements 
of collective facts."  1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 44 & n.16 (4th ed. 
1992); see also Mark McCormick, Opinion Evidence in Iowa, 19 
DRAKE L. REV. 245, 248 (1970) (viewing this rule as allowing for a 
"shorthand rendering of the facts").   
 As recognized by Professor Saltzburg, testimony that a 
person was "excited" or "angry" is more evocative and 
understandable than a long physical description of the person's 
outward manifestations.  STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET. AL., FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE MANUAL 1032 (6th ed. 1994).  For example, a witness who 
testifies that an individual whom he saw staggering or lurching 
along the way was drunk is spared the difficulty of describing, 
with the precision of an orthopedist or choreographer, the 
person's gait, angle of walk, etc.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1974) (permitting under Rule 701 
the testimony of a customs inspector that the defendant appeared 
nervous); State v. Hall, 353 N.W.2d 37, 43 (S.D. 1984) 
(permitting police officers to give lay opinion concerning 
defendant's intoxicated state)3; Kerry Coal Co. v. United Mine 
                     
3
.  All state cases cited herein are decided under state rules of 
evidence identical or analogous to Rule 701 of the Federal Rules.  
As of this entry, some 28 states have adopted Federal Rule 701 
without change.  See WEINSTEIN, supra, ¶ 701[03]. 
  
Workers, 637 F.2d 957, 967 (3d Cir.) (allowing the admission of 
testimony that plaintiff's employees were "nervous and afraid" as 
a shorthand report of witnesses' observations of employee 
reactions), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981). 
 Perhaps the best judicial description of this type of 
testimony under Rule 701 is found in United States v. Yazzie, 976 
F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1992).  Yazzie was charged with statutory 
rape under a federal statute that permitted a defense of 
reasonable mistake as to the age of the minor.  At trial, Yazzie 
asserted that he reasonably believed that the minor, age fifteen-
and-a-half, was over the statutory age of sixteen.  In support of 
this contention, Yazzie called several witnesses who offered to 
testify that, as of the date of the incident, their observations 
caused them to believe the minor to be between the age of sixteen 
and twenty.  The trial court excluded this testimony as 
impermissible lay "opinion" and limited the witnesses' testimony 
to "facts," such as that the minor smoked cigarettes, wore make-
up, and drove a car.  The Court of Appeals reversed, stating: 
 We understand Rule 701 to mean that opinions 
of non-experts may be admitted where the 
facts could not otherwise be adequately 
presented or described to the jury in such a 
way as to enable the jury to form an opinion 
or reach an intelligent conclusion.  If it is 
impossible or difficult to reproduce the data 
observed by the witnesses, or the facts are 
difficult of explanation, or complex, or are 
of a combination of circumstances and 
appearances which cannot be adequately 
described and presented with the force and 
clearness as they appeared to the witness, 
the witness may state his impressions and 
opinions based upon what he observed.  It is 
  
a means of conveying to the jury what the 
witness has seen or heard.   
 
Id. at 1255 (quoting United States v. Skeet, 665 F.2d 983, 985 
(9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The court 
concluded that the testimony of the witnesses satisfied Rule 
701's requirements: 
 Here, the opinion testimony not only meets 
the requirements of sub-part (a) of Rule 701, 
but of both the alternative sub-parts of (b).  
The testimony helps in the understanding of 
the witnesses' descriptive testimony and in 
determining a critical fact at issue -- 
whether it was reasonable for Yazzie to 
believe that the minor was sixteen or older.   
 
  In the case before us, the jurors could 
not themselves assess how old the minor 
looked at the time of the incident: by the 
time of the trial, the minor was almost 
seventeen years old, and her appearance was 
undoubtedly substantially different than it 
had been on the night in question, a year and 
a half earlier.  Thus, the jurors were wholly 
dependent on the testimony of witnesses.  Yet 
the witnesses were permitted to testify only 
to the minor's describable features and 
behavior.  Their testimony was no substitute 
for a clear and unequivocal statement of 
their opinions.  It did not tell the jury 
that these witnesses believed the minor to be 
at least sixteen years old at the time of the 
incident.  
Id. (footnote omitted).   
 Other examples of this type of quintessential Rule 701 
opinion testimony include identification of an individual,4 the 
                     
4
.  United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 
1986) (admitting identification testimony with respect to persons 
depicted in a bank surveillance photograph), cert. denied, 483 
U.S. 1008 (1987); United States v. Allen, 787 F.2d 933, 935-37 
(4th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 944 (1988); United 
States v. Farnsworth, 729 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1984) 
  
speed of a vehicle,5 the mental state or responsibility of 
another,6 whether another was healthy,7 the value of one's 
property,8 and other situations in which the differences between 
(..continued) 
(same); United States v. Jackson, 688 F.2d 1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 
1982) (same), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1043 (1983). 
5
.  United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 552 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(recognizing that a "common illustration" of an admissible 
opinion under Rule 701 is "an expression of opinion by a lay 
observer of a car's speed"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 949 (1987); 
see also Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 1220, 1222-
23 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (admitting opinion testimony as to the point 
of impact of two vehicles from a police officer who did not 
observe a car accident, but arrived shortly thereafter), aff'd, 
720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983). 
6
.  United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982) (concluding that lay opinion 
testimony by FBI agents as to defendant's sanity was properly 
admitted despite fact that the agents had little opportunity to 
view the defendant); Lewisohn v. State, 433 A.2d 351, 355 (Me. 
1981) (concluding, in habeas corpus proceedings, that testimony 
by witness that a certain juror, prior to having been selected 
for jury, had preconceived notions that petitioner was guilty was 
an inference rationally based on the witness' perception and 
helpful in determining a fact in issue, and therefore properly 
admitted). 
7
.  Singletary v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 
1980) (permitting, in a reversal of a denial of disability 
benefits, the lay opinion of a claimant's son that his father was 
an alcoholic and unable to work); State v. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d 
188, 201 (N.C. 1993) (recognizing "the state of a person's 
health" as "a proper subject[] for lay opinion"). 
8
.  See United States v. Ranney, 719 F.2d 1183, 1189 & n.11 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (permitting defrauded investors to testify as to the 
value of their investment); Neff v. Kehoe, 708 F.2d 639, 643-44 
(11th Cir. 1983) (reversing, in an action alleging 
misrepresentations in sale of a coin collection, the exclusion of 
testimony of the plaintiff/buyer, who was determined competent to 
give lay opinion testimony as to the value of the coins, even 
though such testimony was self-serving and unsupported by other 
evidence);  Garris v. Massey, 606 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1980) (allowing owner of similar property to testify as to value 
of property in issue). 
  
fact and opinion blur and it is difficult or cumbersome for the 
examiner to elicit an answer from the witness that will not be 
expressed in the form of an opinion.9  See generally SALTZBURG, 
supra, 1031-36; WEINSTEIN, supra, ¶ 701[02].  These cases, it is 
important to add, all meet the core definitional terms of Rule 
701 -- the opinion is based upon personal knowledge, as 
rationally based thereon, and is helpful to the trier of fact.   
 B. 
 While many, if not most, of the cases decided under 
Rule 701 are of the genre just described, the jurisprudence has 
expanded beyond this core area to permit lay persons to express 
opinions that are not shorthand statements of fact, so long as 
the personal knowledge, rational basis and helpfulness standards 
of Rule 701 are met.  In particular, courts have permitted 
witnesses with firsthand knowledge to offer lay opinion testimony 
where they have a reasonable basis -- grounded either in 
                     
9
.  United States v. McCullah, 745 F.2d 350, 352 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(permitting, in a prosecution for conspiracy to steal, transport, 
conceal and resell a tractor, the testimony of a government agent 
describing the location of the tractor as "hidden" under some 
trees, since it was rationally based on the perception of the 
witness and helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony);  
United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(concluding a PCP and methamphetamine drug user could testify as 
to identity of said drugs based on his prior use and knowledge, 
his sampling of the substance, and the conclusion that the drug 
affected him in the same manner as it had before); State v. No 
Heart, 353 N.W.2d 43, 48 (S.D. 1984) (holding that a police 
officer's opinion that victim's injuries were caused not by a 
fist but by something sharper was properly admitted, given that 
distinction between a wound caused by a fist and a wound caused 
by a sharper object was within realm of an average person's 
experience). 
  
experience or specialized knowledge -- for arriving at the 
opinion expressed.  A conclusion by the trial court that the 
witness possessed sufficient experience or specialized knowledge 
has thus often been used to determine that the witness's opinion 
testimony satisfies the requirements that the opinion be both 
"helpful to a clear understanding . . . of a fact in issue" and 
"rationally based" upon the witness's perception, as expressed in 
the text of Rule 701. 
 Rule 701 cases satisfying these requirements are 
arrayed along a spectrum, ranging from what might be described as 
modest departures from the core area of lay opinion testimony, 
described above, to those which approach the ambit of Rule 702 
expert opinion.  A good example of the former is our opinion in 
Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimbell International, Inc., 620 F.2d 399 (3d 
Cir. 1980) in which we held that a lay opinion from the 
plaintiff's accountant and bookkeeper was proper: 
    The personal knowledge of appellant's 
balance sheets acquired by Zeitz as Teen-Ed's 
accountant was clearly sufficient under Rule 
602 to qualify him as a witness eligible 
under Rule 701 to testify to his opinion of 
how lost profits could be calculated and to 
inferences that he could draw from his 
perception of Teen-Ed's books. 
 
    The fact that Zeitz might have been able 
to qualify as an expert witness on the use of 
accepted accounting principles in the 
calculation of business losses should not 
have prevented his testifying on the basis of 
his knowledge of appellant's records about 
how lost profits could be calculated from the 
data contained therein.  
 
Id. at 403. 
  
 Similar to Teen-Ed are our opinions in Joy 
Manufacturing Co. v. Sola Basic Industries, Inc., 697 F.2d 104, 
110-12 (3d Cir. 1982), and Eckert v. Aliquippa & Southern 
Railroad Co., 828 F.2d 183, 185 n.5 (3d Cir. 1987).  In Joy, an 
action against a manufacturer for damages resulting from the 
failure of two heat treating furnaces, we held that it was an 
abuse of discretion for the district court to exclude the 
testimony of plaintiff's supervisor of production control 
concerning the percentage of plaintiff's losses resulting from 
hearth problems.  Given that the witness in question had 
extensive personal knowledge of plaintiff's plants and the 
furnaces in question, we concluded that the witness's opinion was 
rationally based on his personal knowledge and that the witness's 
inability to state precisely why a furnace was inoperable at a 
particular time was proper material for cross-examination rather 
than a basis for inadmissibility.   
 In Eckert, a brakeman sued a railroad under the Federal 
Employers Liability Act (FELA) and Safety Appliance Act (SAA) for 
injuries suffered when the locomotive he was riding on collided 
with another locomotive and both cars derailed upon failing to 
couple.  In concluding that the district court had improperly 
held the SAA inapplicable to the case, we noted that the 
plaintiff, who had offered testimony relevant to establishing SAA 
violations, was qualified to testify by virtue of his thirty 
years experience and familiarity with railroad procedures as to 
whether injuries would have occurred had the cars been properly 
coupled.  A number of other cases also fit into this category 
  
(that is, they represent a modest expansion from the core lay 
opinion testimony contemplated by the adoption of Rule 701).10   
 C. 
 We recognize, however, that some lay opinion cases have 
begun to move even further beyond the core area of Rule 701 
opinion testimony and have begun, in a subtle gradation, to 
                     
10
.  See, e.g., State Office Sys., Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of 
America, 762 F.2d 843, 845-46 (10th Cir. 1985) (permitting 
admission of testimony as to lost future profits from company's 
president/treasurer with personal knowledge of company's 
operations, sales, and profits); State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248, 
1256-57 (Mont. 1986) (holding that, in a prosecution for driving 
under the influence of alcohol, a police officer was properly 
allowed to testify as a lay witness on the basis of his own 
experience as to what generally happens to a car when its power 
steering fails, where he had worked on vehicles of all kinds for 
over ten years and had experienced power steering failure several 
times); Schmidt v. J.C. Robinson Seed Co., 370 N.W.2d 103, 106 
(Neb. 1985) (holding that the trial court properly admitted, in a 
breach of contract action against a buyer of seed corn, opinion 
testimony by the plaintiff/seed grower's witnesses concerning the 
effect of shattercane on the seed crop, where the opinions, which 
were helpful in determining the fact in issue, were rationally 
based on perceptions stemming from extensive field observation 
and personal farming experience); Hansen v. Skate Ranch, Inc., 
641 P.2d 517, 522-23 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding, in a 
personal injury action arising from a fall at a roller skating 
rink, that the trial court properly admitted testimony of two lay 
witnesses, who were experienced skaters present on the night of 
the accident, regarding safety procedures used by the defendant 
on the night of the accident); Lee v. State, 661 P.2d 1345, 1354-
55 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (concluding that an investigating 
police officer could testify that spots on a carpet were blood, 
and that a chemist, testifying on other matters, could offer a 
lay opinion that the type of glass found at a murder location was 
safety glass); Williamson v. O'Neill, 696 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1985) (holding that the driver of a tractor-trailer rig, a 
co-defendant in a personal injury lawsuit arising from an auto-
truck accident, was uniquely qualified, as the experienced driver 
of the rig involved in the accident, to offer a lay opinion as to 
the reason the trailer separated from the tractor, since his 
opinion would be rationally based on his firsthand perceptions of 
the accident and would help determine causation). 
  
permit lay witnesses to express their opinions in areas in which 
it would ordinarily be expected that only an expert qualified 
under Rule 702 could give such testimony, such as whether a 
product design was defective or whether certain factors (e.g., a 
product defect) caused an accident.  
 For example, in Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 
498, 510-12 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit permitted a lay 
witness to opine that the design of a truck was dangerous and 
defective in a product liability action involving a post-
collision truck fire.  The plaintiffs in this action claimed that 
the design of a Freightliner truck's fuel system was unreasonably 
dangerous and caused a post-collision fuel fire which killed 
plaintiffs' decedent.  Soden, 714 F.2d at 500.  The "thrust" of 
the plaintiffs' argument was that the Freightliner's fuel tanks, 
which were mounted on the sides of the truck under the cab doors, 
were dangerous.  Id.  As the Soden court explained: 
 In particular, they [the plaintiffs] also 
argued that the brackets securing the steps 
to these fuel tanks had pointed ends which, 
in the event of a rollover, could puncture 
the fuel tanks.  The resulting hole or holes 
could release diesel fuel near engine 
components hot enough to ignite the fuel, 
causing a fire in the engine-cab area. 
 
Id. 
 The contested lay witness, Lasere, was a service 
manager who supervised the preventive maintenance of about 500 
trucks and was in charge of the daily maintenance of about sixty 
trucks, mostly Freightliners, including the truck involved in the 
accident.  Id. at 510.  Lasere also was in charge of removing the 
  
truck from the scene of the accident and observed firsthand the 
damage to the fuel tank.  Id.  At trial, he testified for the 
plaintiffs regarding the cause of the accident and the 
dangerousness of the design; specifically, Lasere testified that 
step brackets had punctured the fuel tank.  Id. at 510-11.  In 
particular, he stated that in the case at hand, and in two or 
three other Freightliner accidents, he had observed "puncture 
holes in the fuel tanks at the location of the step brackets."  
Id. at 510.  He then gave his opinion that the step brackets were 
the cause of the puncture holes.  After Soden's accident, Lasere 
testified that he had modified the step brackets in the remaining 
Freightliners in his fleet by "sawing off [the] pointed ends;" 
and he expressed the opinion that the bracket's original design 
was "dangerous."  Id. at 511. 
 Sustaining the admission of Lasere's opinion testimony, 
the Fifth Circuit stated: 
 No great leap of logic or expertise was 
necessary for one in Lasere's position to 
move from his observation of holes in 
Freightliner fuel tanks at the location of 
the step brackets, and presumably caused by 
them, to his opinion that the situation was 
dangerous. . . .  Lasere's testimony with 
respect to the dangerousness of the step 
brackets was also obvious, given the 
modification which he testified he made to 
them after all he had seen. 
Id. at 512.  The court added, however, that Lasere's testimony on 
this point "did constitute an opinion which might have been 
better given by one more formally an expert."  Id.  And the court 
subsequently reiterated that "although Lasere's opinion with 
  
respect to `dangerousness' may have been more properly made by 
one more formally an expert, given the particular facts of this 
case, we conclude that no reversible error occurred in its 
admission."  Id. (emphasis supplied).   
 In our view, cases like Soden stretch the doctrinal 
boundaries of Rule 701 opinion testimony.11  However, we agree 
with the Fifth Circuit that such testimony does fall within the 
ambit of Rule 701's requirement that a lay witness's opinion be 
rationally based on firsthand observations and helpful in 
determining a fact in issue.  Though we agree with Benton Harbor 
that the admission of lay opinion evidence in these technical 
areas (e.g., concerning the existence vel non of a product defect 
or whether an accident was caused by a certain condition) can 
result in an attenuated form of expert opinion evidence far 
removed from the considerations, described supra in Part II.A, 
animating the lay opinion rule,12 it is not for us to rewrite the 
                     
11
.  For example, in United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1577 
(11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1813 (1993), lay 
opinion testimony that burn marks were caused by a stun gun was 
held admissible based on the witness' personal perception of the 
burned skin and nineteen years of experience on the police force. 
The court noted that the opinion's lack of technical/medical 
basis could be exposed on cross-examination and affected the 
weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. 
12
.  In particular, we find problematic the views of some courts 
which would appear to permit the firsthand knowledge of a lay 
witness in these and other technical areas to entirely diminish 
the need for the "knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education" of a witness qualifying under Rule 702.  For example, 
in United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 155-57 (1st Cir. 1989), 
where a lay witness who had used and tasted cocaine on many 
occasions testified that a substance tasted like cocaine, the 
First Circuit affirmed the admission of the evidence by the trial 
court, rejecting the argument that a lay witness cannot testify 
  
rule or reinterpret Rule 701 across the board.13  Accordingly, we 
refuse to hold, as Benton Harbor requests, that all lay witnesses 
offering opinions that require special knowledge or experience 
must qualify under Rule 702.14    
(..continued) 
to such matters because only qualified experts can give such 
testimony.  While the holding appears unexceptionable, the court 
unnecessarily declared that Rule 701 "blurred any rigid 
distinction that may have existed between" lay and expert 
testimony.  Id. at 157.  More refinement might have been in 
order. 
13
.  This unwillingness to find a strict prohibition on lay 
opinion testimony in technical matters is motivated, in no small 
part, by our inability to designate the testimony involved in 
prior caselaw as properly within the exclusive province of 
experts.  Indeed, in some cases, courts have noted that the 
witness giving the lay opinion testimony might have qualified as 
an expert.  See, e.g., Teen-Ed, 620 F.2d at 403 (accountant who 
gave lay opinion testimony might have qualified as expert); see 
also Williams Enters., Inc. v. Sherman R. Smoot Co., 938 F.2d 
230, 233-34 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (insurance broker, who might have 
been qualified as an expert, was properly permitted to testify 
that the construction collapse at issue may have contributed to a 
substantial increase in the plaintiff's insurance premiums); 
United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.) 
(whether the testimony was lay or expert opinion, it was 
permissible for an undercover agent to testify that a defendant 
was acting as a lookout), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982).  
14
.  We believe, however, that such distinctions can and might 
well be made by the drafters of the Federal Rules, in that, as 
our discussion suggests, a better formulation of the lay opinion 
rule would perhaps eliminate these matters from the ambit of Rule 
701.  Such an approach has been adopted by some states, including 
Delaware, which provides: 
   
    If a witness is not testifying as an 
expert, his testimony about what he perceived 
may be in the form of inference and opinion, 
when: 
     (1) The witness cannot readily, 
and with equal accuracy and 
adequacy, communicate what he has 
perceived to the trier of fact 
without testifying in terms of 
inferences or opinions, and his use 
  
 However, the admissibility of opinion evidence under 
the strictures of Rule 701 is not without limit.  Rule 701’s 
requirement that the opinion be "rationally based on the 
perception of the witness" demands more than that the witness 
have perceived something firsthand; rather, it requires that the 
witness's perception provide a truly rational basis for his or 
her opinion.  Similarly, the second requirement -- that the 
opinion be "helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue" -- demands 
more than that the opinion have a bearing on the issues in the 
case; in order to be "helpful," an opinion must be reasonably 
reliable.  In other words, Rule 701 requires that a lay opinion 
(..continued) 
of inferences or opinions will not 
mislead the trier of fact to the 
prejudice of the objecting party; 
and 
 
     (2) The opinions and inferences 
do not require a special knowledge, 
skill, experience or training. 
 
DEL. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE RULE 701 (emphasis added). Similar 
restrictions on lay opinion testimony have been adopted in both 
Florida and Tennessee.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. EVIDENCE CODE § 90.701; 
TENN R. EVID. 701. 
 We take the liberty of commending this issue to the 
attention of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Rules 
of Evidence, which monitors developments in evidence 
jurisprudence.  See generally Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, 
The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years -- The Effect 
of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective 
Revisions of the Rules, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 857, 910 (1992).  
As the authors observed, state modifications in their adaptations 
of the Federal Rules can be quite instructive in providing 
"solutions to identified problems in the drafting or 
implementation of the Federal Rules."  Id. at 862 n.18. 
  
witness have a reasonable basis grounded either in experience or 
specialized knowledge for arriving at the opinion that he or she 
expresses.  See Paiva, 892 F.2d at 157 ("Individual experience 
and knowledge of a lay witness may establish his or her 
competence, without qualification as an expert, to express an 
opinion on a particular subject outside the realm of common 
knowledge.").   
 In sum, for lay opinion as to technical matters such as 
product defect or causation to be admissible, it must derive from 
a sufficiently qualified source as to be reliable and hence 
helpful to the jury.  In order to satisfy these Rule 701 
requirements, the trial judge should rigorously examine the 
reliability of the lay opinion by ensuring that the witness 
possesses sufficient special knowledge or experience which is 
germane to the lay opinion offered.  Our decision does not, as 
suggested by the dissent, "limit the application of Rule 701 to 
human experiences, human conditions, and, perhaps, vehicle speed 
and property value," nor does it eliminate lay opinion as an aid 
to the jury in technical matters.  Rather, as we have stated, a 
lay witness with first-hand knowledge can offer an opinion akin 
to expert testimony in most cases, so long as the trial judge 
determines that the witness possesses sufficient and relevant 
specialized knowledge or experience to offer the opinion.    
 The importance of these precepts is reinforced by the 
recent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).  Daubert, of course, deals 
with the evaluation of the scientific testimony of an expert 
  
focusing upon the reliability of the scientific method on which 
the conclusions of an expert are based.  But, one of the "Daubert 
factors" is the expert's knowledge and qualifications, and the 
centerpiece of the Daubert regime is the gatekeeping role of the 
trial judge, whose duty it is to screen challenged expert 
testimony and assure that it is sufficiently reliable to be of 
assistance to the jury.  Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-95; In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 748 (3d Cir. 1994) 
("Daubert makes clear for the first time at the Supreme Court 
level that courts have to play a gatekeeping role with regard to 
experts.").  While we are careful not to suggest that Daubert 
applies to Rule 701, we believe that its spirit also counsels 
trial judges to carefully exercise a screening function with 
respect to Rule 701 opinion testimony when the lay opinion 
offered closely resembles expert testimony.15   
 Though we acknowledge that important differences 
between lay opinion evidence and expert testimony exist, 
justifying a greater level of scrutiny of Rule 702 expert opinion 
evidence,16 we do not believe such differences effectively 
                     
15
.  The dissent’s assertion that our decision "is directly 
contrary to the teaching of Daubert which focused on the language 
of Rule 702" is simply inaccurate.  Our conclusion that the trial 
judge should rigorously examine the reliability of the opinion, 
by ensuring that the witness possessed sufficient special 
knowledge or experience, derives ultimately, as we have stated, 
from the explicit requirements of Rule 701, which dictate that 
the lay opinion be "rationally based" on the witness's 
observations and "helpful" to the jury. 
16
.  Such differences include the following: (1) designation of 
an opinion as "expert" by the court may cause the jury to give 
the "witness more attention and credence" then an opinion 
admitted from a "lay person" under Rule 701, Richey, supra, 154 
  
vitiate the need for some judicial gatekeeping on the part of the 
trial judge in the case of lay opinion testimony of a technical 
nature.  Allowing a witness, with first-hand knowledge, to offer 
a technical opinion which he lacks the necessary knowledge and 
experience to make, runs afoul of the requirements of Rule 701.  
It is clear, therefore, that in appropriate circumstances a trial 
court should exclude proffered evidence, otherwise admissible as 
relevant under Fed R. Evid. 401, on grounds that the witness's 
knowledge and the consequent basis for his or her rational 
perception are insufficient under the rule.   
 The judicial Rule 701 screening that we speak of for 
cases such as this one is not very different from the screening 
that attends the ordinary expert qualification ruling.  See 
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 740-46.  In determining whether a lay witness 
has sufficient special knowledge or experience to ensure that the 
lay opinion is rationally derived from the witness's observation 
and helpful to the jury, the trial court should focus on the 
substance of the witness's background and its germaneness to the 
issue at hand.  Though particular educational training is of 
course not necessary, the court should require the proponent of 
the testimony to show some connection between the special 
knowledge or experience of the witness, however acquired, and the 
(..continued) 
F.R.D. at 544; and (2) the opinion of a lay witness must be based 
on his or her personal firsthand perception, while an expert may 
opine in response to hypothetical questions, see Teen-Ed, 620 
F.2d at 404 ("The essential difference [between Rule 701 and 
702], however, is that a qualified expert may answer hypothetical 
questions.").   
  
witness's opinion regarding the disputed factual issues in the 
case.     
 The lay opinion testimony held to be admissible in our 
prior Rule 701 decisions satisfied this standard.  In Teen-Ed, 
Inc. v. Kimball International, Inc., 620 F.2d at 399, the  
accountant who testified as a lay witness had very particular and 
quite extensive prior experience with Teen-Ed’s books, which 
allowed him to properly calculate for the court how lost profits 
should be determined and to draw inferences from his examination 
of the accounts.17  Id. at 403.  And in Joy Manufacturing Co. v. 
Sola Basic Industries, Inc., 697 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1982), the lay 
witness had "extensive personal knowledge of Joy's [the 
plaintiff's] plants, its on-going heat treating processes, and 
the two furnaces in question," and we stated that he had 
"sufficient personal knowledge of Joy's [the plaintiff's] heat 
treating facility to make an estimate of what amount of downtime 
was due to the hearth problems."  Id. at 111-12.   
 Moreover, in In re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349 
(3d Cir. 1990), an action by the purchaser of an allegedly 
defective refrigeration system against the seller, installer, and 
manufacturer of the system, the principal shareholder of the 
plaintiff (Logan) was permitted to express an opinion as a lay 
                     
17
.  Moreover, Teen-Ed is a case in which the witness would have 
qualified under Rule 702, but was precluded from testifying as an 
expert because Teen-Ed failed to list him as required in a pre-
trial order.  Id. ("We interpret the pre-trial ruling in this 
case to have required identification of expert witnesses under 
Rules 702 and 703, but not of lay witnesses under Rule 701."). 
  
witness concerning his company's lost profits.  In addition, 
another witness, Gilchrist, who had surveyed the site where the 
refrigeration system was to be located prior to its installation 
and had made an estimate of the weekly sales that could be 
achieved at that site, was permitted to testify concerning his 
survey.  We held that the admission of these lay opinions was 
proper under Rule 701, stating:  "Mr. Logan's personal knowledge 
of his business and Gilchrist's personal knowledge of how he 
prepared his survey were sufficient to make these witnesses 
eligible under Rule 701 to testify as to how lost profits could 
be calculated."  Id. at 360.18   
 Mindful of the need for the proponent of technical lay 
opinion testimony to show that the witness possesses sufficient 
knowledge or experience which is germane to the lay opinion 
offered, we turn to the facts of this case. 
 
                     
18
.  See also Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.) 
(involving a securities action where the plaintiffs claimed that 
the offering memoranda for certain limited partnerships were 
false and misleading), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).  In 
Eisenberg, we held that an attorney had properly been permitted 
to testify as a lay witness with respect to "what he believed 
should have been included in one of the private offering 
memoranda and as to whether the memorandum complied with the 
applicable disclosure requirements."  Id. at 780.  We noted that 
the witness, a partner of one of the individual defendants and a 
principal in a law firm named as a defendant, had sufficient 
knowledge and experience as "a lawyer specializing in business 
litigation, who ha[d] also acted as general counsel for banks, 
trucking companies and brokerage houses."  Id. ("Although he had 
represented clients in securities cases, and testified that he 
was familiar with the disclosure requirements of federal and 
state securities laws, he did not view himself as expert in the 
preparation of offering memoranda.").   
  
 III.  Application of Rule 701 to Jones's Opinion Testimony 
 To recapitulate, the testimony in question here is 
Jones’s opinion that the accident had resulted from metal fatigue 
inside a piston rod which he attributed to the faulty design of 
Benton Harbor’s rod end.  The district court did not limit 
Jones’s testimony to describing the state of the metal inside the 
rod-end and the fact that it had broken.  Rather, it allowed 
Jones to offer a lay opinion as to the cause of the break.  
Specifically, Jones stated that there was a "problem" because 
Benton Harbor's design called for a hole to be drilled through 
the rod end at a point where it was threaded.  App. at 161 & 167.  
The district court admitted Jones’s testimony pursuant to Rule 
701, since it concluded it was within "the ambit of common 
sense." 
  Asplundh contends that the district court properly 
admitted Jones's opinion since the opinion satisfies Rule 701's 
requirements in that it was rationally based on Jones’s firsthand 
observations of the fractured rod and helpful to a determination 
of a fact in issue.  We agree that Jones's testimony satisfied 
Rule 701's requirement of firsthand knowledge since: (1) he saw 
the disassembled lift shortly after the accident from a distance 
of approximately fifteen inches; (2) he observed the colorations 
of the metal fracture surface; and (3) he saw the break in the 
threaded area where a hole had been drilled through the rod.  But 
we do not agree that his opinion was rationally based on these 
observations or helpful to the jury's determination of a fact in 
issue because in proffering Jones’s testimony, Asplundh failed to 
  
satisfy the standard we articulate today for lay opinion 
evidence.   
 In particular, we conclude that the district court 
applied an incorrect legal standard under Rule 701 to the extent 
that it failed to require Asplundh to show a sufficient knowledge 
or experience and sufficient connection between Jones’s special 
knowledge or experience and his opinion regarding the cause of 
the accident and the design of the hydraulic cylinder.19  While 
the district court did summarily conclude at one point in its 
analysis that Jones’s "employment experience" gave him 
"substantial knowledge in this area," we do not believe it 
examined with sufficient rigor the question whether Jones 
possessed the knowledge or experience necessary to offer an 
opinion of such a technical nature.   
 Jones was the fleet maintenance supervisor for the city 
of Portland for more than ten years, supervising the maintenance 
of 1385 variegated pieces of equipment and six or seven repair 
shops.  Jones was present when the aerial lift was disassembled 
and observed the damage to the rod.  Asplundh suggests that, as 
in Soden, the conclusions and opinions expressed by Jones were 
                     
19
.  The dissent contends that the district court did apply a 
correct legal standard under Rule 701 and would therefore review 
the district court’s decision to admit Jones’s testimony for 
abuse of discretion.  We disagree, given that we conclude that 
the district court violated the "rationally derived" and 
"helpfulness" standards of Rule 701 in failing to examine with 
sufficient rigor the question of whether Jones possessed 
appropriate experience or knowledge to offer an opinion regarding 
the cause of metal failure and the proper design of hydraulic 
cylinders.    
  
those that a normal individual in his position with his 
experience would have drawn.  See Soden, 714 F.2d at 512.  But 
Benton Harbor's response is telling.  It points out that Jones 
lacked formal education; had not taken courses in metallurgy, 
material failures or metal fatigue; and had not designed a 
hydraulic cylinder.  He had one year of college studies plus 
other job-related courses.  Moreover, Jones had never conducted 
any studies of materials or material compositions.  Besides 
having never designed a hydraulic cylinder, he had never 
personally participated in manufacturing a hydraulic cylinder.  
Although he worked some seven or eight months as a production 
control manager for a company which used hydraulic cylinders in 
their product, in that position he was responsible only for 
initiating manufacture and had no design responsibilities 
notwithstanding his bold assertion, "I think I know how to make 
hydraulic cylinders."  App. at 168. 
 The question we are presented with is whether it was 
permissible for Jones to express the opinion that the rod end had 
broken due to metal fatigue and that the design of the rod end 
was a "problem."  App. at 160-61 ("The reasons [for the accident] 
are two: one, the hole through the pin caused . . . the rod to be 
weakened and, two, the threads . . . on the rod itself caused the 
breaking point.  They were sharp, and it broke right at the point 
where all of those things intersected.  That was the problem.  
There’s no doubt in my mind about it . . . .").  In our view 
these opinions are not ones that an average lay person would be 
equipped to draw, absent sufficient evidence of specialized 
  
knowledge or experience.  We disagree with the dissent’s 
assertion that "[f]atigue failure of metal is not unfamiliar" to 
persons "such" as Jones, and simply do not believe that the 
average lay person, dissent infra at page 16, absent sufficient 
knowledge or experience with metals, is qualified to offer a 
meaningful opinion on questions of metal fatigue of this nature.  
Metal fatigue is a technical concept.  There are many reported 
cases in which experts have testified (and disagreed) as to 
whether metal fatigue could be detected based on a post-accident 
examination,20 but we have not found a single reported case in 
which a lay witness has given such testimony.  The consistent use  
of experts to testify regarding such questions underscores the 
technical nature of Jones’s opinion.   
 In describing this testimony as within the "ambit of 
common sense," the district court would characterize Jones’s 
testimony as equivalent to the observation that "if you take a 
piece of metal and put in a vice and bend it back and forth 
enough times, it fatigues and it breaks."  The dissent agrees.  
But, Jones’s opinion was far more technical and, in particular, 
attributed the accident to the manner in which Benton Harbor had 
chosen to design the rod end.  See App. at 167-68 (Jones 
attributed the accident to the fact that the "rod was drilled 
                     
20
.  See, e.g., Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 261 
(1st Cir. 1993); Marrocco v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 
225 (7th Cir. 1992); Salter v. Westra, 904 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th 
Cir. 1990); Grover Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster, Inc., 728 
F.2d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 1984); Southwire Co. v. Beloit Eastern 
Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
  
through, and the fact that the rod eye was screwed on on a 
threaded -- two threaded surfaces," and questioned this design 
since he "kn[e]w how to make hydraulic cylinders" and he "had 
never seen a cylinder that size configured that way").    
 While the average lay person -- after examining the rod 
end and seeing that it had broken in a spot where the rod end was 
threaded and a hole had been drilled through it -- might well 
properly conclude under Rule 701 that the rod end had broken at 
what appeared to be its weakest point, such a person could not 
reasonably go further and conclude that the rod end was 
defectively weak at this point.  The dissent contends the 
admissibility of this testimony was proper since "this is a 
nation where many individuals grow up with extensive mechanical 
experience and capabilities."  Dissent infra at page 14.  We 
simply do not believe that the realm of common knowledge extends 
to such issues as the presence and cause of metal failure and the 
proper design of hydraulic cylinders.  Given the requirements of 
Rule 701, Asplundh needed to demonstrate that Jones possessed 
relevant experience or specialized knowledge germane to his 
opinion in order to satisfy the rationally derived and 
helpfulness standards of the rule.  While a lay witness may 
acquire this additional insight either by formal education or 
practical experience, it appears Jones simply possessed 
neither.21 
                     
21
.  The dissent asserts, infra at page 13, that "Jones had 
substantial technical knowledge so as to tell whether metal is 
fatigued" but then fails to point to any evidence which would 
demonstrate that Jones had any knowledge or experience in 
  
 Jones's experience as Portland's fleet maintenance 
supervisor, supervising the upkeep of 1385 pieces of equipment 
and six or seven repair shops, is inapplicable.  While these are 
weighty responsibilities, they do not seem to have anything to do 
with designing or evaluating the design of machinery.  By way of 
example, the maintenance supervisor for a fleet of rental cars 
would hardly be qualified to express an opinion on whether the 
braking system of a particular model was defectively designed, 
absent some special qualifying proffer.  Moreover, as fleet 
maintenance supervisor, Jones was involved in supervising the 
maintenance of numerous types of equipment and had no special 
experience with metal failure or hydraulic cylinders.  Likewise, 
Jones's prior employment experience as a production control 
manager does not seem pertinent, since he had no design 
responsibilities.  Equally inapplicable is Jones’s previous job 
as a riveter in the manufacture of blowoff fuel tanks for 
military aircraft and the fact that he repaired his own 
automobile.  App. at 181.  Neither appear to enhance Jones’s 
knowledge or experience to offer an opinion on metal fatigue or 
the design of hydraulic cylinders.  
 In support of the admission of Jones's opinion 
testimony, Asplundh relies principally on the Fifth Circuit's 
opinion in Soden, discussed supra, which, as we have stated, 
(..continued) 
assessing metal fatigue.  Absent some evidence of such experience 
or knowledge, Jones’s opinion was inadmissible under Rule 701 
since it could not be rationally derived from his observations or 
helpful to the jury. 
  
would likely satisfy the standard we articulate today.  While we 
acknowledge that Jones's testimony bears a certain similarity to 
Lasere's opinion regarding the design of the Freightliner fuel 
tanks, we believe Jones simply lacked the unique experience which 
allowed Lasere, the witness in Soden, to properly offer his lay 
opinion. 
 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the testimony of 
Lasere was properly admitted under Rule 701 on the grounds that 
he had eighteen years of experience in repair and maintenance of 
the particular trucks involved in the accident and, importantly, 
he had actually modified these trucks, which were under his care, 
so as to prevent the alleged defect in the truck’s design from 
rupturing the freightliner’s fuel tank in future accidents.  
Lasere actually examined on previous occasions an unknown number 
of Freightliners that had been involved in serious accidents 
(presumably, in light of the nature of his job, not a great 
number), and in two or three of those cases he had observed facts 
that provided a reasonable basis for inferring that the design of 
the step brackets had caused holes in one of the fuel tanks, 
which were located near the engine.  Moreover, he had devised a 
simple means (sawing off the pointed ends) by which the step 
brackets might be made safer.   
 More importantly, Lasere's opinion, regarding the 
dangerousness of the design of the Freightliner, was rationally 
derived from his particular experience with the Freightliners' 
  
fuel tanks.22  This experience allowed the Fifth Circuit to 
conclude that Lasere had "very considerable practical experience 
and specialized knowledge."  Soden, 714 F.2d at 511.  Given his 
unique experience, the court was able to conclude that his 
conclusion that the design of the step brackets was dangerous 
required "no great leap in logic or expertise."  Id. at 512.  
 While we agree with the dissent that the opinion 
admitted in Soden went, in a sense, beyond that offered by Jones 
since Lasere characterized the design of the Freightliner’s fuel 
tanks as "dangerous," we believe, given Lasere’s unique knowledge 
and experience with the truck’s fuel tanks, he was qualified to 
draw such an opinion.  In contrast, Jones simply lacked anything 
resembling Lasere’s specialized knowledge or experience.  In 
particular, Jones had never before taken these cylinders apart in 
association with similar accidents.  Moreover, unlike Lasere, 
Jones had never taken any steps to modify, what he perceived to 
be, the faulty design of the rod end.  
 Asplundh does not respond to the problem of Jones's 
lack of specialized knowledge and experience.  Rather, it 
suggests that it is enough that Jones observed the rod end 
firsthand, that his opinion testimony helped the jury to 
determine the cause of the lift's failure and the role played in 
                     
22
.  As noted, Lasere's bases for his opinion were:  (1) the 
design featured pointed step brackets resting on the fuel tanks; 
(2) the fuel tanks were near the cab and the engine; (3) the 
reasonable inference that this design had a tendency to cause 
punctures of the tanks in roll-over accidents; and (4) and the 
fact that he found a simple way to make the design safer. 
  
it by the rod manufactured by Benton Harbor, and that Jones was 
subject to cross-examination.  We disagree.  As we have stated, 
under Rule 701 the trial judge must play some gatekeeping role so 
as to ensure that the rationally derived and helpfulness 
requirements of the rule are met.   
 To use a simple yet illustrative example, if an issue 
in a case was whether the sun revolved around the earth, and the 
proponents of the Ptolemaic system proposed to prove their case 
by lay opinion testimony, such testimony could satisfy Asplundh's 
requirement of "firsthand" observation ("I have observed the sun 
firsthand for many years, and I have seen that each day it moves 
across the sky from the east to the west.").  Such testimony 
would also be helpful to the jury to the extent that it would 
tend to suggest a result that the jury should reach.  And such 
testimony could be subjected to cross-examination by a proponent 
of the Copernican system.  But it does not follow that this lay 
opinion testimony meets the rational basis or helpfulness 
requirements as they are contemplated by Rule 701 or that it 
would be admissible.  Yet nothing in the district court's 
analysis would have excluded such testimony.   
 
 
   IV. Conclusion 
 We are convinced that the court’s admission of Jones’s 
opinion testimony was not harmless and therefore represents 
reversible error, since we cannot conclude that "it is highly 
probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment."  
  
Advanced Med. Inc. v. Arden Med. Sys., 955 F.2d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 
1992).  As we have explained, the district court erred in 
admitting Jones’s testimony under Rule 701 by failing to apply 
its analysis with the rigor required in this type of case.  More 
particularly, the district court needed to determine whether 
Jones’s knowledge or experience qualified him to offer an opinion 
which attributed the accident to metal failure and the allegedly 
improper design of Benton Harbor’s hydraulic cylinder.  There is 
no indication in the record that Jones possessed sufficient 
knowledge or experience to allow Asplundh to satisfy the standard 
articulated today and obtain admission of Jones's opinion.  
Nevertheless, we will remand the case to allow the district court 
to determine, in light of our opinion, whether to permit further 
proceedings to qualify Jones's opinion.  In the absence of such 
proceedings or the establishment of such qualification, the 
district court should order a new trial.  
 The judgment of the district court and its order 
denying the motion for a new trial will be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 ___________________________ 
  
Asplundh Manufacturing Division, a Division of Asplundh Tree 
Expert Co.; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, 
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JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
  I respectfully dissent. 
  The Court today painstakingly analyzes the history 
of Rule 701 and its intended relaxation of the rules regarding 
opinion evidence.  The Court then develops a "core area" of Rule 
701 lay opinion testimony and unduly limits the admissibility of 
testimony outside of that core area.  In order to do so, the 
Court imposes on Rule 701 the language and requirements of Rule 
702 that a demonstration of the witness's knowledge and 
experience support the opinion, and thus abrogates the 
distinction between Rule 701 and 702 in the area of technical 
opinion evidence.  The Court then determines that the district 
court did not use "sufficient rigor" in determining "whether the 
testimony in question was informed by sufficient experience or 
specialized knowledge," supra at 4, and utilizes an essentially 
discretionary rule under the guise of plenary review.  In my 
view, the district court properly applied Rule 701, and did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.   
 
 I. 
  Today the Court argues that the district judge's 
ruling on the admissibility of Jones's opinion evidence involved 
interpretation of Rule 701 and, accordingly, should be given 
  
plenary review.  The authority relied upon simply does not bear 
the weight which the Court places on it.   
  In DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990), this Court held that the district 
court's "cursory" ruling excluding expert testimony erroneously 
interpreted the Federal Rules in two respects:  (1) the court 
analyzed the expert's qualifications under Rule 703, rather than 
Rule 702, id. at 953; and (2) the court implicitly required the 
expert to accept a study's conclusion in order to utilize the 
underlying data as a basis for testimony, although Rule 703 
contains no such requirement.  Id. at 954.  Because admissibility 
depended on the district judge's interpretation of Rule 703, the 
Court applied a plenary standard of review, id. at 944, and 
remanded the case for further consideration of the proffered 
testimony.  Id. at 956-57.  Most tellingly, the Court instructed 
that the ruling on remand should display "sensitivity to the 
relevant policy judgments reflected in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence," which "embody a strong and undeniable preference for 
admitting any evidence having some potential for assisting the 
trier of fact and for dealing with the risk of error through the 
adversary process."  Id. at 956.   
  The Court also relies on United States v. Furst, 
886 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990), 
which held that there was insufficient foundation for the 
admission of business records.  Id. at 572.  In Furst, the Court 
  
articulated the rule the Court today espouses, id. at 571, but 
did not further indicate which standard it used, stating only 
that "the district court erred" in admitting the evidence.  Id. 
at 573.   
  Most significantly, however, both DeLuca and Furst 
rely upon In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust 
Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 265 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  In that case, this Court held: 
  The scope of our review . . . 
depends on the basis for the [trial 
court's] ruling.  When the trial 
court makes Rule 104(a) findings of 
historical fact . . . we review by 
the clearly erroneous standard of 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52.  But a 
determination [by the trial court], 
if predicated on factors properly 
extraneous to such a determination, 
would be an error of law.  There is 
no discretion to rely on improper 
factors. . . .  In weighing factors 
which we consider proper, the trial 
court exercises discretion and we 
review for abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 265-66.  The Court proceeded to apply all three standards.  
Most critically relevant for our purposes, the Court held that 
the district court erred in developing its own standards and in 
acting as the ultimate arbiter of the reliability of the 
materials upon which the expert based his opinion.  See Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 
1321-30 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd, In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 
  
F.2d 238.  This Court held the district court's approach to be 
"fundamental legal error because, as a matter of law, the 
district court must make a factual inquiry and finding as to what 
data experts in the field find reliable."  In re Japanese Elec. 
Prods., 723 F.2d at 277.23  This Court held that the district 
court's approach "reject[ed] the decision of the Judicial 
Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress" in "adher[ing] to an 
unusually restrictive view as to the basis on which an expert's 
opinion may be laid."  Id. at 277.  The ruling of the district 
court, containing legal interpretation of the meaning of the 
Rule, was correctly subjected to review under a plenary standard.  
  The record before us stands in sharp contrast to 
that in DeLuca and Furst, and, particularly, to that in In re 
Japanese Electronic Products.  In the case before us, the 
district court did not involve itself in an interpretation of the 
Rule as in DeLuca and In re Japanese Electronic Products.  Those 
cases cannot support application of the rule of plenary review in 
this case. 
  Nothing in the record indicates that the district 
judge engaged in interpretative analysis of the meaning of Rule 
                     
23
.  In In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995), this Court 
followed Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 
2786 (1993), and rejected its substantive discussion concerning 
Rule 703 in In re Japanese Electronic Products.  Paoli, 35 F.3d 
at 747-748.  More significant for our purposes, Paoli continued 
to recognize plenary review of a district court's interpretation 
of a Federal Rule of Evidence.  Id. at 749. 
  
701.  Rather, the district judge carefully analyzed Jones's 
deposition testimony and found it admissible by applying the 
Rule.  His analysis was quintessentially an exercise of 
discretion which should be reviewed only for abuse and be given 
substantial deference.  The Court today pays no heed to the 
district court's thorough and detailed ruling on the 
admissibility of Jones's testimony, but simply casts that ruling 
aside on the basis of this Court's own analysis.   
 
 II. 
  A close look at the record reveals that the 
district judge exercised great care in ruling on the 
admissibility of this evidence.  After reading a portion of the 
deposition during consideration of the objections, the district 
judge remarked:   
  Just because you [sic] don't have a 
sheepskin doesn't mean he is not an 
expert.  It seems to me he has 
substantial knowledge in this area, 
so that because of his employment 
experience, many years on the job, 
he can tell whether metal is 
fatigued; he can tell whether 
screws, threads, threading of 
screws, whatever are shorn, 
whatever, going beyond the ken of a 
lay person.   
 
  (Emphasis added).   
  The district judge specifically 
articulated Asplundh's argument 
that Jones testified as an expert, 
  
not a lay person, and stated that 
"[u]nder [Rule] 701, of course, we 
are talking about lay opinion."  
The district court expanded upon 
this by stating:    This guy 
is not an expert.  However, he has 
all this experience, these are his 
opinions, these are the reasons for 
his opinions, but we are not going 
to call him as an expert.  We want 
to get the evidence in, let the 
jury assess it in view of his 
umpteen years on the force. 
 
After dismissing the jury, the district judge commented to 
counsel that:   
   
  I don't have any background in 
metallurgy, but I can take this 
paper clip and I can bend it for a 
while.  I can give you a pretty 
good idea when I think it's going 
to break because of metal fatigue.  
And all I do is occasionally use 
paper clips.  That is a lay 
opinion.  
After considering whether the rod's weakness required expert 
opinion, the district judge commented:  "That would fall within 
the ambit of common sense embraced by both sides here."   
 The next morning, the district judge ruled: 
  Counsel, with respect to the [Rule] 
701 issue, I have been reviewing 
  
the transcript. . . .  So, under 
all the circumstances looking at 
Rule 701, as I must, and finding 
ample explanation, be it valid or 
not within the record for the 701, 
allegedly 701 opinions there 
adduced, I am going to overrule the 
objection and permit that testimony 
to be read.  I believe it goes to 
the weight.   
 
  The record before us reveals a painstaking study 
of the deposition testimony of Jones and the application of Rule 
701 in determining that it was admissible.  This evidentiary 
ruling is palpably an exercise of discretion rather than an 
interpretation of the Rule. 
 
  III. 
   The Court today rewrites Rule 701, holding that 
the district court misinterpreted Rule 701 by failing to examine 
with sufficient rigor whether Jones possessed the knowledge or 
experience necessary to offer an opinion of a technical nature.  
Supra at 4.  When the Court's lengthy analysis and discussion is 
stripped aside, the holding has two parts:  first, the Court has 
interpreted Rule 701 to incorporate the Rule 702 requirement that 
there be a demonstration that the witness possesses sufficient 
experience or specialized knowledge to qualify the witness to 
express a technical opinion; second, the Court requires that this 
Rule be examined with sufficient rigor.   
  The Court articulates the experience and knowledge 
requirement after an exercise in ambivalence.  The Court first 
  
refuses to hold "that all lay witnesses offering opinions that 
require special knowledge or experience must qualify under Rule 
702."  Supra at 23.  It so states after having found problematic 
the views of some courts which would permit a lay witness in 
technical areas to diminish the need for the "knowledge, skill, 
experience, training or education" of the witness qualifying 
under Rule 702.  Supra at 22 n.14.  The Court then states that 
"the admissibility of opinion evidence under the strictures of 
Rule 701 is not without limit," and reads the language of the 
Rule to require that "a lay opinion witness have a reasonable 
basis grounded either in experience or specialized knowledge for 
arriving at the opinion he or she expresses."  Supra at 24-25.  
The Court comments "[t]he judicial Rule 701 screening that we 
speak of for cases such as this one is not very different from 
the screening that attends the ordinary expert qualification 
ruling."  Supra at 27.  It goes so far as to commend the rule 
followed in Delaware which excludes lay opinion requiring special 
knowledge, skill, experience or training.  Supra at 23-24 n.16.   
  The Court holds that "[i]n order to satisfy these 
Rule 701 requirements, the trial judge should rigorously examine 
the reliability of the lay opinion by ensuring that the witness 
possesses sufficient special knowledge or experience which is 
germane to the lay opinion offered."  Supra at 25.  These are not 
requirements of Rule 701, but rather Rule 702.  Thus, as much as 
the Court protests, it has indeed stitched to the fabric of Rule 
  
701 the language and requirements of Rule 702.  This is directly 
contrary to the teaching of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), which focused on 
the language of the Rule 702, in issue before it. 
  If the Court stopped at this point, we could 
simply observe that the district court made the appropriate 
findings of experience and knowledge germane to the profferred 
opinion, based on a lengthy colloquy with counsel and a complete 
study of the deposition testimony overnight, before admitting the 
testimony under Rule 701.  
  The Court today, however, does not stop with 
incorporating the provisions of Rule 702 into Rule 701.  It adds 
the "sufficient rigor" requirement, which it gives plenary 
review.   
  Indeed, the basis of the Court's decision is that 
the district court made an impermissible interpretation of Rule 
701 because it "failed to examine with sufficient rigor" whether 
the testimony was informed by sufficient experience or 
specialized knowledge.  Interpretation of a rule requires a 
determination of the meaning of the language of the rule.  On the 
contrary, failure to examine the testimony with sufficient rigor 
involves a value judgment and a weighing of factors, which 
inherently relate to the exercise of discretion.  Failure to 
examine with sufficient rigor simply does not equate to 
  
interpretation.  The rationale of the Court can find support only 
from Lewis Carroll.24 
  Further, the sufficient rigor test creates no 
legal yardstick upon which the district court's ruling can be 
measured.  Certainly, with respect to Rule 701 and numerous other 
evidence questions, the admissibility of evidence involves a 
determination of where on a spectrum the testimony falls.  This 
is reason for applying an abuse of discretion test to such 
considerations.  It is, however, the trial court's determination 
of such questions to which we apply the abuse of discretion rule.  
Here, the Court has simply moved the exercise of discretion from 
the district court and into the hands of the appellate court.  
What is sufficient rigor and what is not simply becomes a call 
for the appellate court, not unlike the decision of a baseball 
umpire, except there is no definition of the strike zone. 
  The Court finds it necessary to concede that the 
district court "did summarily conclude at one point in its 
analysis that Jones's 'employment experience' gave him 
                     
2
.  Carroll wrote: 
 
  "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty 
said, in  rather a scornful tone, 
"it means just what I choose it to 
mean--neither more nor less."   
 
  "The question is," said Alice, 
"whether you can make words mean so 
many different things."   
LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE:  ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH 
THE LOOKING GLASS 269 (Clarkson N. Potter, New York 1960).  
  
'substantial knowledge in this area,'" but that the court did not 
examine "with sufficient rigor the question whether Jones 
possessed the knowledge or experience necessary to offer an 
opinion of such a technical nature."  Supra at 31.  The Court 
today simply refuses to accept that the district court, with a 
firm understanding of the requirements of Rule 701, made 
appropriate and sufficient findings to support the admissibility 
of the evidence.   
  The Court's rewritten Rule 701 replaces the 
district court's discretion on admitting or rejecting evidence 
with appellate discretion exercised under a formula with no true 
objective standard and plenary review.  The Court effectively 
switches the roles of the trial and appellate courts. 
  
 IV. 
  This Court has held that a trial court's 
determination of the admissibility of lay opinion testimony "may 
be overturned only for clear abuse of discretion."  Joy Mfg. Co. 
v. Sola Basic Indus., Inc., 697 F.2d 104, 111 (3d Cir. 1982).  
Weinstein's Evidence, citing numerous cases, states succinctly:  
"Basically, Rule 701 is a rule of discretion."  3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN 
ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ¶ 701[02], at 701-31 (1995).  The 
district court's careful ruling, which we have discussed above, 
and the record upon which it was based compellingly demonstrate 
  
that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
testimony of Jones.   
  Jones testified regarding differentiations in 
color at the fracture site and that the rod fatigued and broke.25  
He also testified that the stop blocks were not relevant to the 
accident26 because the rod eye broke off due to the way the rod 
                     
3
.  ASPLUNDH'S COUNSEL:  With respect to the cylinder rod 
portion, the broken end, what with respect to the color of the 
broken end did you observe? 
 JONES:  Well, one was oxidized.  The one that had been 
broken prior or earlier on was oxidized. 
 ASPLUNDH'S COUNSEL:  When you say "oxidized"  
 JONES:  It's a different color.  It's duller  more 
dull. 
 . . . 
 JONES:  And the fresh break was simply fresh. 
 
See App. at 162. 
 
 ASPLUNDH'S COUNSEL:  Can you tell me upon what you base 
the opinions you just gave on? 
 . . . 
 JONES:  Well, I saw the rod removed from the eye.  I 
saw where it had fatigued and broke halfway through, and then I 
saw where it was a fresh break.  So one shows something that had 
been broken for a long period of time and another one breaking 
recently.  And it broke at the thread, and it broke through the 
place where the pin was installed.   
 
See App. at 160-61.  
4
.  ASPLUNDH'S COUNSEL:  Why do you say that it's your belief 
that [the stop blocks] have no bearing on the case? 
 . . . 
 JONES:  Okay.  Because the presence of those blocks, 
whether they're there or not there would not have stopped the 
breaking of  off the rod eye.  They're not relevant. 
 ASPLUNDH'S COUNSEL:  Why do you say that? 
 . . . 
  
end was drilled through, threaded, and, thus, weakened.27  He 
concluded that this was the problem which caused the failure of 
the boom.  He further stated that he had not seen a cylinder 
configured in this way.   
  Jones's observations were based upon his practical 
experience.  He was fleet maintenance supervisor for the City of 
Portland at the time of the accident and had held this position 
for over ten years, supervising between 60 and 100 employees, 6 
or 7 city repair shops, and the maintenance of 1,385 pieces of 
equipment, including the Asplundh aerial lift.  In that job, 
Jones spent 30 percent of his time overseeing the work done and 
had done mechanical work himself.  In a previous job, he riveted 
(..continued) 
 JONES:  Because the rod eye broke off because of the 
way the end of the rod was drilled to secure a screw on the rod 
eye.   
 
See App. at 159-60.  
5
.  ASPLUNDH'S COUNSEL:  Okay.  As fleet maintenance manager for 
the City of Portland, did you develop a conclusion as to why the 
accident occurred? 
 . . . 
 JONES:  The reason that this thing broke and Sackerson 
was killed is because of the way the rod itself fatigued inside 
the rod eye.  First one half and then the other half went to 
ultimate at the time it finally eventually broke.  The reasons 
are two:  one, the hole through the pin caused the  yeah, the 
rod to be weakened and, two, the threads on the eye itself  on 
the rod itself caused a breaking point.  They were sharp, and it 
broke right at that point where all of those things intersected.  
That was the problem.  There's no doubt in my mind about it, 
. . . .  
 
App. at 160-61. 
 
  
blowoff fuel tanks for military aircraft.  He stated that he had 
a high mechanical aptitude and understood the way things worked.   
Some of the deposition transcript upon which the district court 
based its ruling is significant, although not introduced into 
evidence at trial.  For example, Jones stated:   
  Well, even if you work in your own 
garage, if you take a piece of 
metal and put it in a vice and bend 
it back and forth enough times, it 
fatigues and it breaks.  Anyone 
who's ever dealt with anything 
solid knows that.  You can do it 
with a paper clip, bend it until it 
breaks.  That's fatigue.  I 
certainly know what metal fatigue 
is through my own knowledge and 
discovery of the way life works.    
Given Jones's experience, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that he was qualified to express a lay 
opinion on metal fatigue.   
  Indeed, the district court considered the factors 
the Court today requires, specifically, Jones's substantial 
knowledge, employment experience, and years on the job.  Any 
interpretation of Rule 701 in this case springs from this Court's 
own analysis, rather than the application of Rule 701 by the 
district court.  As the district court simply applied Rule 701 to 
the profferred testimony, we must judge that determination on an 
abuse of discretion basis.     
  The Court today simply gives insufficient weight 
to the district court's articulated reasoning that his opinion 
was based on his experience and that Jones had substantial 
  
technical knowledge so as to tell whether metal is fatigued and 
whether threads are shorn, which goes beyond the ken of a 
layperson.  The Court should not reject the articulated reasoning 
of the district court so facilely.      
  The Court today firmly asserts that metal fatigue 
is a technical concept, and that "the realm of common knowledge 
[does not extend] to such issues as the presence and cause of 
metal failure and the proper design of hydraulic cylinders."  
Supra at 34.  The Court switches the roles of the trial court and 
the appellate court.  The district court made abundant findings 
not only on Jones's knowledge and experience, but also on the 
common knowledge concerning metal fatigue.  It is the appropriate 
role of the district court to make such findings.  Today, the 
Court simply rejects these views and appropriates the factfinding 
role to itself.   
  Perhaps the physical process of metal fatigue 
requires technical knowledge, but the appearance of a metal 
fracture site demonstrating fatigue failure was described by 
Jones, and the district court properly concluded this was based 
on his knowledge, an appropriate subject for lay opinion.   
  The ruling of the district court and the deference 
due it must be considered in light of the evident fact that this 
is a nation where many individuals grow up with extensive 
mechanical experience and capabilities.  Repairing household 
machinery, automobiles and farm equipment is a central part of 
  
life for many individuals, from early to late years, either 
vocationally or avocationally.  Fatigue failure of metal is not 
unfamiliar to such persons.  The testimony given by Jones 
explaining his background fits squarely into this pattern as the 
district judge recognized.   
  Textual support for Jones's opinions can be found 
in 8 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts Metal Failure 127 (1960 & Supp. 
1994), which states that, after a number of cycles of stress, a 
small crack may form in the metal where the stress is highest 
and, under continued stress, grow until the metal fractures from 
overload.  Id. at 129.  Proof of Facts outlines the signs of 
metal fatigue, including the fracture pattern on the broken 
surfaces and the presence of stress raisers such as threads and 
holes.  Id. at 130-31.  Proof of Facts describes the markings on 
fracture surfaces as follows: 
  A fatigue fracture will often show 
a characteristic pattern on the 
fracture surfaces.  Frequently 
there will be two areas that are 
markedly different in appearance.  
This is because only a portion 
fractured from fatigue, the 
remainder failing from overload.  
The fatigue portion will often be 
shiny and will often contain 
conchoidal or "clam shell" markings 
which indicate the position of the 
crack at the various stages of its 
progression.  The overload portion, 
on the other hand, will generally 
be duller and will show some 
ductility or plastic deformation.   
 
  
Id. at 145 (emphasis added).  While Jones did not testify about 
clam shell markings, he did carefully explain the differing 
colors of the metal, indicating the development of the fracture, 
the overstressing of the metal, and the final parting at the 
fracture surface.   
  The text discusses the use of experts in analyzing 
fatigue factors, but closes with the following observation: 
  While the aid of competent 
professional help is important in 
explaining the failure from a 
scientific standpoint, the 
assistance that may be given by 
persons qualified by training and 
experience in a particular trade or 
craft should not be overlooked.  
For example, a knowledge of the 
properties and characteristics of 
metals is essential to a blacksmith 
or welder, and either may have 
acquired by experience a knowledge 
as to the dangerous conditions in 
metals brought about by surface 
irregularities, notches, tool marks 
and the like.  Similarly, a 
mechanic experienced in working 
with trailers would be qualified to 
testify as to the dangers inherent 
in a loose trailer hitch, and an 
elevator repairman may speak 
authoritatively concerning 
experience in the industry with 
cable failures and the standard 
practice of periodically cutting 
off and discarding a length of 
cable to avoid failures. 
 
Id. at 137.  Jones's testimony is just such an example. 
 
      The Court's opinion, with its abundance of 
scholarly reasoning, proves self-defeating.  In essence, the 
  
Court simply examines Jones's qualifications as an expert, points 
to his experience and opines that Jones's experience has nothing 
to do with designing or evaluating the design of machinery.  
Supra at 35.  However, design was not the central point of 
Jones's testimony.  Although Jones testified that he "had never 
seen a cylinder that size configured that way," see App. at 167, 
the central thrust of his testimony concerned his observations of 
the fracture itself and his opinion that this caused the collapse 
of the lift boom.28 
  The Court also points out the deficiencies of 
Jones's formal education:  that he had taken no courses in 
metallurgy, material failure or metal fatigue, had not designed a 
hydraulic cylinder, and had but one year of college education 
with no studies in material compositions.  Supra at 32.  These 
comments might bear on the qualification of Jones to give expert 
opinions under Rule 702, but they do not reach the practical 
                     
6
.  The Court characterizes Jones's opinion as stating that "the 
fracture was caused by metal fatigue and was attributable to the 
design of the rod end."  Supra at 6.  The Court later 
characterizes the issue in the case as "whether it was 
permissible for Jones to express the opinion that the rod end had 
broken due to metal fatigue and that the design of the rod end 
was a 'problem.'" Supra at 32.  The Court then determines that 
Jones was not qualified to express an opinion on whether the rod 
end was defectively designed.  Supra at 33-35.  The Court's 
characterization carries Jones's testimony beyond that which his 
spoken words will support.  In substance, Jones described a 
fatigue fracture which occurred at the rod's weakest point, where 
it was drilled through and threaded.  I read Jones's testimony to 
express an opinion on causation, but not on defective design.    
  
experience and knowledge that qualify Jones to express a lay 
opinion.  Compare FED. R. EVID. 701 and FED. R. EVID. 702.   
  Rule 701 does not require technical knowledge or 
expertise but, rather, requires that lay opinion be rationally 
based on the witness's own perceptions, i.e. "the familiar 
requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation."  FED. R. 
EVID. 701 advisory committee's note.  Jones's opinion was based 
on first-hand observation of the fractured rod.  From a distance 
of approximately 15 inches, he observed the differing colorations 
of the metal fracture surface and saw that the rod broke in a 
threaded area with a hole in it.  He had ample opportunity to 
observe the fracture and to form his opinion. 
  In Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 620 F.2d 
399, 404 (3d Cir. 1980), the Court observed that the essential 
difference between lay and expert opinion evidence is that the 
expert may answer hypothetical questions, whereas the lay witness 
may testify only from facts perceived by him, not those "made 
known to him at or before the hearing."  Id.; FED. R. EVID. 703.  
See also In re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 359-60 (3d Cir. 
1990).  Jones was not asked hypothetical questions, he did not 
express expert opinions, and his testimony was not admitted on 
that basis. 
  When evidence is admitted under Rule 701, "cross-
examination and argument will point up the weakness," id., and 
the jury will weigh the lay opinion testimony in light of any 
  
countervailing evidence.  Benton Harbor's counsel scrutinized 
Jones's training and experience on cross-examination and read 
excerpts to the jury which highlighted those issues.  Jones's 
lack of formal training should not prevent the admission of his 
opinion.  See United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1577 (11th 
Cir. 1992) (admitting lay opinion testimony that a stun gun 
caused burn marks based on the witness's perception of the burned 
skin and 19 years of police experience; holding that the 
opinion's lack of a technical/medical basis could be exposed on 
cross-examination and affected the weight, not the admissibility, 
of the evidence), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1813 (1993); Joy Mfg., 
697 F.2d at 112 (holding that inability to state precisely why 
product was inoperable did not prevent lay testimony that product 
was inoperable but, rather, was "proper material for effective 
cross-examination").  Based upon Jones's experience, the district 
court could properly conclude that Jones was qualified to express 
these opinions.  Any shortcomings or weaknesses of the testimony 
could have been developed on cross-examination.  As the district 
judge cogently observed, the issue was not one of possessing a 
sheepskin, but rather of possessing common experience.  Even with 
flaws in reasoning, a district judge may properly conclude that 
"hearing the . . . testimony and assessing its flaws was an 
important part of assessing what conclusion was correct and may 
certainly still believe that a jury attempting to reach an 
accurate result should consider the evidence."  In re Paoli R.R. 
  
Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing 
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 2786, and the requirements for expert 
testimony), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995).   
  The Court today appears to recognize and generally 
to limit the application of Rule 701 to human appearance, human 
conditions, and, perhaps, vehicle speed and property value.  This 
should not be the extent of permissible lay testimony.  Jones's 
testimony that metal fatigue caused the fracture and the accident 
is more evocative and understandable than a long physical 
description of the rod's outward appearance, although Jones 
offered both.  The Court quotes the following from United States 
v. Yazzie, 976 F.2d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 1992), a case which 
involved lay opinion on whether a rape victim appeared to be 
fifteen or sixteen years old: 
  "If it is impossible or difficult 
to reproduce the data observed by 
the witnesses, or the facts are 
difficult of explanation, or 
complex, or are of a combination of 
circumstances and appearances which 
cannot be adequately described and 
presented with the force and 
clearness as they appeared to the 
witness, the witness may state his 
impressions and opinions based upon 
what he observed." 
Id. at 1255 (allowing lay opinion testimony) (quoting United 
States v. Skeet, 665 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1982)).  These 
general principles apply equally to Jones's testimony.  See also 
Eckert v. Aliquippa & S. R.R. Co., 828 F.2d 183, 185 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1987) (cited with approval by the Court and allowing lay opinion 
  
testimony as to whether an accident would have occurred had the 
railroad cars involved coupled properly). 
  In determining the propriety of lay opinion, other 
courts have considered:  (1) whether the witness has personal 
knowledge of the facts from which the opinion was derived; (2) 
whether the opinion is rationally supported, i.e. "apparent to a 
'normal person' in [the witness's] position;" and (3) whether the 
opinion is helpful to the trier of fact.  Soden v. Freightliner 
Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Lubbock Feed 
Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d 250, 263 (5th 
Cir. 1980)).  Jones's testimony is not unlike that at issue in 
Soden and meets the standards articulated by Soden. 
  The Court here argues that "cases like Soden 
stretch the doctrinal boundaries of Rule 701 opinion testimony."  
Supra at 22.  The witness in Soden, Lasere, was a service manager 
in charge of the maintenance of trucks, and his qualifications 
closely parallel those of Jones.29  Lasere testified that a step 
bracket located near the fuel tank caused holes in the tank and 
that this design was dangerous.  Id. at 510-11.  The Fifth 
Circuit stated that Lasere's opinion was one that "may have been 
more properly made by one more formally an expert," id. at 512, 
                     
7
.  The Court today accepts Lasere's knowledge and qualifications 
but rejects those of Jones.  Certainly, the fact that Lasere had 
eighteen years experience and Jones ten is not sufficient basis 
to distinguish the two.  This only serves to illustrate that this 
determination is one of degree, properly decided by the district 
judge in the exercise of discretion.  
  
but that his opinion was adequately grounded in his own 
experience and observation.  Likewise, Jones based his opinion of 
causation on his examination of the rod, the different 
coloration, and the fact that the break occurred near a drilled 
hole in a threaded area.  The court in Soden commented that 
Lasere's testimony on causation was rationally supported and 
"would have been apparent to a 'normal person' in his position."  
Id.  This applies equally to Jones's opinion.  The court in Soden 
expressed reservation only as to Lasere's testimony that the 
situation was dangerous.  However, this final step in Lasere's 
testimony is not matched by a similar opinion of dangerousness by 
Jones.  Thus, rather than this case exceeding the scope of Soden, 
Jones's observations and opinions are squarely supported by 
Soden's reasoning. 
  The district court reached a different conclusion 
on Jones's competence to testify as a lay witness than would this 
Court.  However, this should not be dispositive unless there is 
an abuse of discretion.   
  Professor Wigmore comments that the true theory of 
the opinion rule is simply to reject superfluous evidence.  7 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1918, at 11 (James Chadbourn rev. 
1978).  Wigmore's text quotes from Cornell v. Green, 10 S. & R. 
14, 16 (Pa. 1823), stating that when the facts from which the lay 
witness "received an impression are too evanescent in their 
nature to be recollected, or are too complicated to be separated 
  
and distinctly narrated, his impressions from these facts become 
evidence."  Id. at § 1924, at 33.  Wigmore concludes that:  
"[w]hat is chiefly wrong is by no means the test itself, but the 
illiberal and quibbling application of it."  Id.   
  The Court states that it can find no reported case 
where a lay witness testified regarding metal fatigue.  However, 
none of the cases cited in footnote 22 of the Court's opinion 
deal with the admissibility of opinion evidence.30  Further, 
Salter v. Westra, 904 F.2d 1517, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (cited by 
the majority in footnote 22), discusses not only expert 
testimony, but lay testimony of a mechanic describing the 
fracture surfaces of the lug bolts with the evident corrosion and 
rust streaks.31 
                     
8
.  The fact that "experts have testified (and disagreed) as to 
whether metal fatigue could be detected," supra at 33, is not 
relevant here.  None of the cases cited by the Court involving 
expert opinion on metal fatigue remove such testimony from the 
realm of lay opinion.  See Fusco v General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 
259, 261 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting experts' disagreement on whether 
fatigue or impact caused fracture); Marrocco v. General Motors 
Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 225 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting experts' 
agreement that loss of allegedly defective component precluded 
evaluation of possible defects, including fatigue); Salter v. 
Westra, 904 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting experts' 
disagreement as to cause of accident where their opinions "relied 
heavily upon the mechanic's description of the physical state of 
the wheels and the tire hub before he repaired them"); Grover 
Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster, Inc., 728 F.2d 784, 789 (6th 
Cir. 1984) (noting expert testimony that metal fatigue caused 
fracture).  Most tellingly, these opinions each deal with issues 
other than the admissibility of this evidence.  
9
.  See also Sullivan v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 952 F.2d 141, 
145-46 (5th Cir. 1992), where the district court ruled that a 
witness was not qualified to testify as an expert on metallurgy, 
but allowed him to testify as a lay witness under Rule 701 on his 
  
  In distinguishing Rule 701 and Rule 702 evidence, 
we should recognize that the expert with impressive credentials 
comes before a jury with an aura unmatched by most lay witnesses.  
We also must recognize that the jury may weigh either lay opinion 
testimony or expert testimony and find it wanting.  In the case 
before us however, the district court, after a painstaking study 
of the deposition testimony, determined that Jones's testimony 
was properly admissible as lay opinion, and that the jury should 
be the arbiter of its weight and value.   
  The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting Jones's testimony under Rule 701. 
   
(..continued) 
observations from microscopic examination and testing of a socket 
which split in half.  The court did not allow the witness to 
opine whether the socket was defective or why it failed, but 
commented that a contrary decision would not necessarily have 
required reversal.  Id. at 146. 
